Pro-Iranian militias in Mosul: Between stability and destabilization

Involvement of Shia militias in the reconstruction of Mosul
Abstract
After the defeat of the Islamic State (IS) in 2017, Mosul was largely left in ruins. Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) militias that initially helped to defeat IS gained a foothold in the city and became increasingly involved in the profitable field of reconstruction. The most powerful of these militias are Shiʿa and pro-Iranian, whereas the Mosul area is predominantly Sunni territory. Taking the sectarian organization of Iraq into account, this article looks at the involvement of Shiʿa militias in the reconstruction of Mosul and the possible implications this could have on the region’s stability.
Keywords: Popular Mobilization Units, Mosul, Iraq, Iran, Shia militias, reconstruction of Mosul, pro-Iranian militias, Stability in the Middle East
Introduction
Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, is only a two-hour drive from Erbil. Although both are Iraqi cities, they are very different. Erbil is governed by the Kurdish authorities, whereas Mosul and the Nineveh governorate fall under central Iraqi rule. Immediately after crossing the last checkpoint leading into central Iraq, road signs, uniforms and language (from Kurdish to Arabic) change. Posters of martyrs, many of whom were killed in the fight against the so-called Islamic State (IS), line the roads. Politicians on election posters seek votes and, most notably for this research, flags, banners and posters of different pro-Iranian (Shiʿa) militias are common sights. The presence of these militias might seem surprising, as Mosul is predominantly a Sunni city with minorities including Assyrians, Turkmens, Kurds and Shabaks (the latter of whom are both Sunni and Shiʿa). In the rest of central Iraq, the majority of the population is Shiʿa.
To research this topic, the author, together with a colleague and their Iraqi fixer went on multiple fieldwork trips to north Iraq last year (spring, summer and autumn) to interview stakeholders involved with the reconstruction business. They spoke to (e.g.) politicians, businessmen, NGOs, heritage institutions, construction companies, representatives of trade unions and (political representatives of) militias.
The destruction of Mosul
Mosul was the biggest city controlled by IS in Iraq. After it was retaken in 2017, it was largely left in ruins. About 15 neighborhoods in West Mosul, including the old city, a UNESCO-designated heritage site, were completely destroyed, home to an estimated 230.000 people. A further 23 neighborhoods were damaged to a lesser extent, and the cost for the city’s most urgent reconstruction needs was estimated at around $1.1 billion in 2017.1 Since then, reconstruction has become a multimillion-dollar industry. To date, large parts of the city are either being reconstructed or remain in ruins.
Militias in Iraq
So, how are Mosul’s reconstruction and pro-Iranian Shiʿa militias connected? Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq is organized along sectarian lines. Power is divided among Iraq’s largest religious and ethnic groups: Shiʿa, Sunni, Kurds, and minority groups. This system, known as al-muḥāṣaṣa al-ṭāʾifiyya (sectarian apportionment), is notoriously corrupt and client-based. Political groups often focus more on increasing their own power rather than serving national interests.2 By highlighting religious and ethnic affiliations as primary markers of political identity, the system has contributed to societal schisms and civil wars.3 Since 2005, Shiʿa groups, often with close ties to Iran, have gained increased influence in Iraqi politics, leading to Sunni fears of Iranian domination in Iraq.4
When IS took over large parts of Iraq, Iran was heavily involved in the fight against it, mainly by supporting Shiʿa militias from the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) both financially and militarily.5 The PMU is an umbrella organization of predominantly Shiʿa militias, but also includes Sunni, Christian, Yezidi, and Shabak militias (among others). Established in 2014 to help defeat IS,6 they played a crucial role in the city’s liberation.7 Afterwards, they managed to gain a foothold in the city and the surrounding Nineveh plains.
The Popular Mobilization Units and the reconstruction of Mosul
The PMU are now state-sponsored by Iraq and they form a state within a state, with institutions parallel to those of the Iraqi state.8 They have gained increasing control over state institutions, such as ministries and security services, and are officially part of the Ministry of Defense. Many of these PMU militias are loyal to and/or sponsored by Iran. The PMU consist of two main groups: ‘core militias’ established before IS, and smaller, less significant militias formed to fight IS. The largest and most powerful militias belong to the former. In and around Mosul, we now see various militias, including Munazzamat Badr, Kataʾib Hizbullah and ʿAsaʾib Ahl al-Haqq. Other smaller, local militias are also active, such as Kataʾib Babiliyun and Liwaʾ al-Shabak.
The PMU were essential in the fight against IS, but soon after IS was defeated, pro-Iranian militias gained a foothold in the city and became increasingly involved in (e.g.) the profitable field of reconstruction.9 In an interview conducted in June 2023, a spokesperson from the PMU headquarters in Nineveh mentioned how they were part of all government structures: political, economic and security. Accordingly, they did not intervene in the city’s physical reconstruction directly; rather, their role was to provide security to all actors, including those in charge of reconstruction projects, such as NGOs and (foreign) investors.10 Whether these services are voluntary is uncertain, as there are also reports of them demanding to be hired and pressuring NGOs to hire contractors of their choice.11 Beyond physical reconstruction, the PMU also play a crucial role in the context in which reconstruction occurs. For example, they control the main roads and checkpoints, deciding who enters the city and collecting (illicit) taxes at the checkpoints.12 Members of Liwaʾ al-Shabak also are said to have a “monopoly on scrap metal”,13 which is important for reconstruction projects and a significant source of income. This notion was confirmed during various fieldwork trips in the second half of 2023. Additionally, during an interview, a representative of the political office of Hizbullah in Iraq mentioned that they use their influence to pressure the decision-making process for tenders and projects.14
The growing influence of the PMU in and around Mosul extends beyond the economic and political spheres. There are also signs of demographic changes in the form of ‘Shiʿization’. Allegedly, “thousands of public and private properties” were seized predominantly by the PMU, coordinated through their economic offices.15 In addition, the PMU is accused of preventing the return of many displaced Christians in the Nineveh plains and the outskirts of Mosul as part of their attempt to induce demographic changes and increase their economic (and political) profits.16 Militias from the south were also given permission to own land and businesses, preventing displaced people from returning and instead creating Shiʿi settlements in Sunni-dominated territory.17
So, the PMU is openly present in and around Mosul, with political offices, PMU flags and soldiers at checkpoints, banners on main roads, and PMU paraphernalia available in military shops, among other things. Their involvement in the reconstruction is also clear, although the exact extent remains obscure and disputed, as this involvement is generally covert. Why is this relevant, and why is it significant in the Iraqi context that these are mostly Shiʿi groups?
Implications of the militias in the Mosul area
The presence and influence of these militias could have a destabilizing effect on the Mosul area. Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim who, for years, gave preferential treatment to fellow Sunnis, despite them being a demographic minority in Iraq.18 After his fall, Shiʿi groups, often with close ties to Iran, became increasingly powerful at the expense of the Sunni minority. Consequently, many Sunnis felt marginalized, just as many Shiʿa had felt marginalized before 2003. This discontent was, in part, fertile ground for local Sunni insurgencies, that later joined forces with al-Qaʿida and eventually evolved into the Islamic State. The Mosul area is currently relatively peaceful and secure, partly because insurgent cells are hunted down and kept under control by the PMU and Iraqi security forces. Additionally, people in Mosul are tired of war and instability after the years under IS and prefer to focus on reconstruction rather than new conflicts.
Nevertheless, in a relatively poor and neglected part of the country, the arrival of outsiders who take jobs, land, political positions and economic opportunities could potentially cause significant harm, both materially and psychologically, especially if these outsiders are Shiʿa. Unfortunately, in Iraq, we have seen in the past (and present) that such grievances were often translated into sectarian discourses. This is largely a consequence of how the country is organized, in addition to nepotism and corruption. This does not mean that all Iraqis harbor sectarian agendas or dislike people of other religions or ethnicities. Rather, due to the way the country is organized, people are, in a sense, pushed into a sectarian mindset, which has caused considerable harm in the past.
Understanding Iraq’s pro-Iranian militias is particularly relevant today, as they have recently carried out attacks against American and allied forces in the region under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, especially following the events of October 7 in Palestine and Israel. This escalation increases the risk of retaliation and further local, regional and international instability. Iran’s involvement is central to these concerns.
Nevertheless, although the biggest and most powerful militias are pro-Iran, including those present in Mosul, and exert significant influence in Iraq’s politics, economy and security sector, not all PMU are Shiʿa, let alone Muslim, and not all Shiʿa are Iranian proxies. Although most units of the PMU are undoubtedly heavily influenced by Iran – be it financially, militarily or ideologically – it is over-simplified to view the militias as Iranian proxies alone. They should also be viewed as local, Iraqi products with their own Iraqi agendas and the implications should also be viewed from a local perspective. PMU involvement in Mosul’s reconstruction does not necessarily serve Iran’s geopolitical interests, but rather brings (mostly financial) benefits to the militias themselves, often at the expense of the local population, in addition to the sectarian tensions caused by the militias. Zooming out from geopolitics and zooming in on the domestic conditions, this situation ultimately does not address the needs of the people of Mosul, who are still recovering from past conflicts and are in the midst of rebuilding their city. Yet, we have seen time and again that Iraq functioned as a battleground for the interests of other countries and the consequent destabilization this has brought to the area.19

Footnotes
- UNDP, Funding Facility for Stabilization 2017 Q2 Report: Scaling up in Mosul (UNDP 2017), 24, https://info.undp.org/docs/pdc/Documents/IRQ/UNDP%20IQ-%20Stabilization%20Q2%202017%20Report-20170806.pdf. ↩︎
- Renad Mansour, “The Political Logic Behind Iraq’s Fragmented Armed Forces,” MERIP 306, (Spring 2023), https://merip.org/2023/04/the-political-logic-behind-iraqs-fragmented-armed-forces/. ↩︎
- Toby Dodge, “Beyond Structure and Agency: Rethinking Political Identities in Iraq after 2003,” Nations and Nationalism 26, no. 1 (2020): 1. ↩︎
- Kashif Mumtaz, “Shia Factor in Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam,“ Strategic Studies 25, no. 1 (2005): 14–15. ↩︎
- Beston Husen Arif, “Iran’s Struggle for Strategic Dominance in a Post-ISIS Iraq,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 3 (n.d.): 344–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2019.1636525. ↩︎
- Abdullah al Jbour, The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq: Regional Dynamics and Local Variables (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2021), 19, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/17860.pdf. ↩︎
- Although the exact extent to which the PMU participated in the liberation is disputed. ↩︎
- Can Demir, “The Antagonist Pro-Iranian Militias In The al-Hashd al-Sha‘abi As Sources Of Terror And Instability In Iraq,” Journal of Defence and War Studies 33, no. 1 (n.d.): 42. ↩︎
- For example Judit Neurink, “How Mosul’s Liberators Became Occupiers,” Al-Monitor, December 1, 2021, www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/how-mosuls-liberators-became-occupiers.; Nawzet Shamdin August, “The Story of the Real Estate Theft in Mosul: Armed Forces, Parties and Powerful People Possess More Than 20.000 Properties,” Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism, March 19, 2023, https://nirij.org/en/2023/03/19/the-story-of-the-real-estate-theft-in-mosul/. ↩︎
- Interview conducted in North Iraq on June 14, 2023. Note that all interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity. ↩︎
- Isadora Gotts, “PMU Economic Offices Undermine Fragile Stability in Mosul,” Al-Monitor, May 27, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/05/iraq-economy-mosul-pmu.html#ixzz8QaWz1MrJ. ↩︎
- International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Paramilitary Groups: The Challenges of Rebuilding a Functional State (International Crisis Group, 2018), 12, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/188-iraqs-paramilitary-groups-challenge-rebuilding-functioning-state. ↩︎
- Neurink, “How Mosul’s Liberators Became Occupiers.” ↩︎
- Interview conducted in North Iraq on October 25, 2023. ↩︎
- August, “Real Estate Theft in Mosul.” ↩︎
- European Union Agency for Asylum, Country Guidance: Iraq (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022), https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022_06_Country_Guidance_Iraq.pdf. ↩︎
- New Lines Institute Staff, A Thousand Hezbollahs: Iraq’s Emerging Militia State (New Lines Institute, May 4, 2024), https://newlinesinstitute.org/nonstate-actors/a-thousand-hezbollahs-iraqs-emerging-militia-state/. ↩︎
- Note that this was not necessarily out of sectarian considerations. Rather, Saddam Hussein relied heavily on Iraqis from Tikrit (Tikrīt) and neighboring areas and many non-Tikriti Sunnis also felt marginalized. For more, see Lisa Blaydes, State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton University Press, 2018), 310-312. ↩︎
- The latest book of the autor – Reconstructing Mosul: Occupation, destruction and rebuilding – is now online availible: https://books.ugp.rug.nl/ugp/catalog/book/181. ↩︎
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Kiki Santing (1. November 2024). Pro-Iranian militias in Mosul: Between stability and destabilization. Krit:Arab. Abgerufen am 21. April 2025 von https://kritarab.hypotheses.org/636